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The financial crisis that began in the United States in the summer of 2007, and then spread to 
Europe, has now become global and increasingly serious.  Although governments and central banks 
around the world have taken many costly measures, they have not yet been able to contain the crisis.  The 
threat of global recession and the dire social consequences that could accompany such a downturn make  
internationally coordinated, but nationally different, expansion of fiscal spending to help maintain 
economic activity essential. It also calls for an urgent reform of the  global financial architecture and 
regulatory system.  Given the magnitude of the task, calls for the upcoming G20 summit on November 
15th in Washington D.C. to initiate a “Bretton Woods II”  process are cause for cautious optimism.  
 
No fundamental – or global – reforms can be enacted if they do not arise from a process that is 
inclusive of both industrial and developing countries, and in which both large and small countries have a 
meaningful voice.  In short, representative global institutions – not ad hoc groupings – must be at the 
center of  reform efforts.  Why?  Any global solutions, whether short-term measures to stabilize the 
current situation or long-term measures that attempt to prevent future financial meltdowns, must be 
designed to protect not only the G7 or G20 economies but also emerging markets and, especially, the poor 
populations of developing nations.  Otherwise, global economic stability cannot be restored, and both 
economic growth and poverty reduction efforts will be derailed. 
 
The current deep crisis and previous ones that have hit developing countries demonstrate that 
crises are inevitable in liberalized financial systems without appropriate regulation. This is increasingly 
recognized by a majority of  economists. As the need to contain the present crisis and to prevent future 
ones has become urgent on a global scale, the need for far-reaching regulatory reforms has increasing 
political support.  However, this window of political opportunity for introducing deep regulatory changes 
may be narrow, so the task is urgent.  A growing consensus exists that there must be reform.  The key 
question is: how BEST to do it?  Two key principles provide the framework for the necessary regulatory 
reforms: comprehensiveness and counter-cyclicality. 
 
Comprehensiveness 
 In order for regulation to be efficient, it is essential that the domain of the regulator be the same 
as the domain of the market regulated.  Otherwise, it will be impossible to avoid the massive loopholes 
that led to the current crisis.  In the United States, for example, banks represent less than 25 percent of 
total financial assets, and only a portion of commercial banking activities are adequately regulated, with 
off-balance-sheet activities essentially excluded.  Clearly, a regulatory system focused on the banking 
industry – and hardly at all on the rest of the financial system – will not suffice.  The “shadow financial 
system” must be regulated.  After all, the greatest problems in the present crisis have been created by 
those very unregulated agents and instruments, such as investment banks, in the first case, and 
Collateralized Debt Obligations, Structured Investment Vehicles and Over the Counter Derivatives, in the 
second.  
 Comprehensive measures are required at two levels.  The first is transparency for all actors and 
activities, which would require both registration and disclosure of relevant variables for all financial 
institutions.  This is a pre-condition for comprehensive regulation, but one that would also benefit  other 
financial market participants and investors.  The second is comprehensive and equivalent regulation, to 
cover all entities that invest or lend on behalf of other people and that would apply to all the activities 
they undertake in all jurisdictions, including off-shore centers. 
 
Counter-cyclicality 
 In addition to being comprehensive, regulations should have a strong counter-cyclical focus to 
avoid the excessive accumulation of leverage and increase of risk-taking during booms, as well as to 
prevent asset-price bubbles from feeding into the credit expansion.  Reliance upon the internal models of 
financial institutions, the major focus of Basel II, must be discarded.  The present crisis has already shown 
how perilous the use of similar risk-models can be, as the herd-behavior demonstrated in de-leveraging 
led directly to greater financial instability.   
 Counter-cyclical policies should not be difficult to implement, as Spanish and Portuguese 
regulators have already shown in their requirement that banks have dynamic provisions (which amount to 
de facto counter-cyclical regulations).  Although Spanish banks have not been immune from the crisis, 
they are weathering it much better than many other countries without such provisions.  This positive 
experience needs to be built upon by other countries, either through forward-looking provisions and/or 
counter-cyclical capital.  The key idea is that provisions and/or capital required should increase as risks 
are incurred – when loans grow more – and should fall when loan-expansion slows or reverses.  This 
would strengthen banks in boom times and discourage them from excessive lending.  At the same time, it 
would make it easier for banks to continue lending in difficult times because of the cushions they had 
accumulated. 
 
Global Financial Reform 
 Any system designed on these key principles should be based on a well-functioning network of 
national and regional authorities, with stronger powers given to the apex of the system, which in this 
sense could be refered to as the “global financial regulator”.  The creation of such a network and global 
regulator, which would have a global reach, including all financial and offshore centers, should be studied 
urgently. A substantially reformed Financial Stability Forum working with Basel banking regulators, 
IOSCO (the securities regulators) and insurance regulators, could form the basis for such network. 
However, its membership and representation would have to be significantly broadened and democratized 
to include strong representation of emerging and developing countries.   
The IMF should be revamped in four significant ways.  One, its Special Drawing Rights should 
be transformed into the basis for developing a truly global reserve currency to overcome both the 
inequities and the instability inherent in a global reserve system based on national or regional currencies 
of industrial countries.  Two, it should be redirected to concentrate on macroeconomic policy 
coordination, rather than the G7 (or any “G”) doing it, as this is the only way to give developing countries 
a voice in this issue.  Three, the IMF should become more like a central bank, providing liquidity in a 
rapid and agile way, and without crippling conditionalities.  The recently-created SLF (Short-Term 
Liquidity Facility) of the IMF is a step in the right direction, but access to it should be broadened to more 
countries. Fourth, the IMF should discuss what types of regulations on cross-border flows make sense to 
avoid the strong boom-bust cycles and contagion of financial crises to emerging and developing 
countries. 
Finally, a Bretton Woods II should use the occasion of the Review Conference on Financing for 
Development, to take place in Doha at the end of November, as a major opportunity to launch a 
participatory process leading to a reform of the global financial architecture, with the backing and close 
collaboration of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. 
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http://www.fondad.org/uploaded/D%20Arista%20-%20Griffith-Jones/DArista-Griffith-
Jones%20on%20Financial%20regulatory%20reform.pdf 
Jane D’Arista and Stephany Griffith-Jones 
 
“Responding to the Financial Crisis: An Agenda for Global Action” 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Bhattacharya.pdf 
Amar Bhattacharya, Kemal Dervis and José Antonio Ocampo 
 
 
 
 
 
